NATO

Despite the protestations of unity at the recent Chicago summit, it is clear that NATO has problems.

In the old days NATO was supposed to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. With the end of the Cold War, that rather simple formulation became no longer applicable, but the organisation has yet to agree on a new one. Basically, there are three competing philosophies amongst members.

The first group, consisting of the the Baltic States, Poland and possibly Norway, still worries about the Russian threat across (in some cases) the border. That threat seems to have increased recently, as President Putin talks tough and Ukraine starts sliding into the Russian sphere of influence. The second group, led by the U.S. and the U.K., wants NATO to be a force in international relations. Libya is the best example of this; Syria might yet become so. While the third group, led by France and Germany, wants NATO to be the building block for a more common European defence policy. A sort of military counterpart to the E.U. in economic matters.

These groups are not mutually exclusive; France was a prime mover on the Libyan operation, for instance (though Germany refused to take part). Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the three different ideas can be moulded into a coherent whole. Missile shields and "smart defence", collaboration over equipment purchases and use, are operational activities, not a substitute for a strategy.

And looming over everything is the quagmire of Afghanistan. At the summit it was agreed by everybody that combat troops would be out by the end of 2014, and that the Afghans would start taking over operationally in the summer of 2013. But that was an easy decision (even if France is likely to spoil the party by pulling its troops out this year). The difficult one will be what (if anything) to do if everything goes pear-shaped in 2015. As I say, NATO has problems.

Walter Blotscher